In traditional public key encryption schemes, data encrypted by a public key pk can be decrypted only by a secret key sk corresponding to pk, and the relation between pk and sk is static. Therefore, the schemes are unsuitable for control of access to a single data by several users. Meanwhile, functional encryption (FE) is an encryption scheme that provides more sophisticated and flexible relations between pk and sk. Thus, FE enables only one pk to encrypt the data with any conditions for decryption, so it is considered a very useful tool for the access control of data on the cloud server. However, implementing the current FE scheme is a non-trivial task because the deep knowledge of the scheme is required. This is an obstacle factor to deploy the FE scheme in the real-world security systems. In this paper, we propose an implementation of the FE (Ciphertext-Policy FE and Key-Policy FE, which are useful classes of FE) library usable even for people who do not have the deep knowledge of these schemes.
Introduction
In recent years, cloud computing has become common for enterprise systems. For example, suppose that a company uses a cloud server and does access control on the server. When we want only a specific person (e.g., a person who belongs to the personnel department or an administrative manager) to access data, we usually have to let the server control access so that only the person can access the data. However, if we use a cloud server and store data on it without considering security of the data, it may be insecure. If the server controls access permissions of the data on it, an attacker may get all the data on the server by breaking into the server. In traditional public key encryption schemes, the relation between public key pk and secret key sk is static, so the schemes cannot encrypt data properly in the aforementioned scenario. Therefore, if more than one user with different access permissions respectively access the cloud server, we need to use several public keys to encrypt with different policies for decryption. Therefore, we may need to have a lot of public keys, and this situation is sometimes inconvenient.
Meanwhile, functional encryption (FE) [15] , [16] is an encryption scheme that provides more sophisticated and flexible relations between pk and sk. Using an FE scheme, we can encrypt the data with an access policy like ("the personnel department" OR ("the general affairs department" AND "manager")), and as a result, even if an attacker succeeds in attacking the server, he or she cannot get any information of the encrypted data on the server. An FE scheme enables only one pk to encrypt the data with any policy for decryption. Therefore, we can easily manage access permissions on the server by using FE. In addition, be-1 University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8577, Japan a) hasegawa.keisuke.wm@alumni.tsukuba.ac.jp cause the server does not have control on access permissions, it is possible to store data on the server securely, even if the server cannot be trusted. Hence, an FE scheme is considered a very useful tool for access control of data, but the implementation of an FE scheme is a non-trivial task because the special knowledge of the scheme is required. This is considered an obstacle factor to deploy the FE scheme in the real-world security systems.
Our Result
This paper * 1 proposes an implementation of the CP-FE and KP-FE (useful classes of FE scheme based on Refs. [15] , [16] ) library usable even for people who do not have the deep knowledge of the FE scheme based on pairing-based cryptography * 2 .
Using our system, we can easily manage data securely on the cloud server even if the server is untrusted. Furthermore, a user can encrypt data by specifying an access policy (a logical formula expressing a condition for decryption, which consists of attributes and logic gates), and only the user with proper attributes can decrypt the data.
Related Works
Sahai and Waters [17] introduced attribute-based encryption (ABE) for access control on encrypted data, and some functional encryption schemes have been introduced after that. Thus, there is some trend toward the realization of ABE such as Refs. [3] , [8] , and also the standardization of pairing-based cryptography [10] . Okamoto and Takashima [15] , [16] introduced functional encryption in 2010, which can support non-monotone access structures * 1 A preliminary conference version of this paper was presented at [9] . This paper is the extended version of Ref. [9] . * 2 The field of pairing-based cryptography is about cryptosystems using pairing, and has been growing rapidly since Refs. [5] , [18] were proposed. The definition of paring is in Appendix A.1. c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan and is adaptively secure in the standard model. Therefore, by virtue of its rich properties, the Okamoto-Takashima functional encryption can be a building block in other cryptographic protocols. So, it can be used in much more cases in the real life compared with other schemes and the implementation and standardization of the Okamoto-Takashima scheme are expected. However, the existing functional encryption libraries Refs. [1] , [2] , [7] , [12] , [21] are not based on Refs. [15] , [16] , and the construction of Refs. [15] , [16] is so complex an algorithm that there is no library implementing the scheme of Refs. [15] , [16] until now as far as we know. Implementing FE schemes usually requires pairing operations on elliptic curves such as Refs. [7] , [14] , [20] and our implementation uses Ref.
[20].
Functional Encryption
In this section, we explain functional encryption (FE). In traditional public key encryption schemes, the ciphertext encrypted by a public key pk is decrypted only by a single secret key sk corresponding to the pk, and the relation is unchanged. Meanwhile, FE provides more sophisticated and flexible relations between the keys where a secret key, sk Ψ , is associated with a parameter, Ψ, and message m is encrypted to a ciphertext ct Υ := Enc(m, pk, Υ) using system public key pk along with another parameter Υ.
Ciphertext ct Υ can be decrypted by secret sk Ψ if and only if a relation R(Ψ, Υ) = T rue holds. Then, Ψ is a parameter relevant to secret key (decryption key) sk.
In our library, two types of FE schemes based on Refs. [15] , [16] are available * 3 . One is called Ciphertext-Policy Functional Encryption (CP-FE) scheme, and the other is Key-Policy Functional Encryption scheme. Although these two schemes seem to be similar, these schemes are supposed to be used in different situations respectively.
Ciphertext-Policy Functional Encryption (CP-FE)
In the CP-FE scheme which is implemented in this library, the parameter Υ expresses an access structure described by attributes and threshold gates, and the parameter Ψ expresses a set of attributes of the secret key holder. An attribute that expresses information of user is expressed by a category (e.g., "Gender", "Position") and value that is relevant to the category (e.g., "male", "manager") in the scheme. For example, "Gender = male" is used as one attribute, Υ is a predicate like ("Gender = male" AND "Position = manager"), and Ψ is a set like ("Gender = male", "Position = manager"). We note that AND gates can be constructed as n-out-of-n threshold gates and OR gates as 1-out-of-n threshold gates, and the predicate of t-out-of-n threshold is expressed as (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n , t) (p represents an attribute, and n ≥ t) in this paper. For example, ("Gender = male" AND "Position = manager") is expressed as ("Gender = male", "Position = manager", 2).
In the scheme, the relation R(Ψ, Υ) = T rue holds and the encrypted data can be decrypted if and only if the set of attributes Ψ satisfies the access structure Υ (Fig. 1) .
Thus, only one public parameter pk can specify the access pol- * 3 These schemes are based on Appendix G.1 and G.2 of Refs. [15] , [16] .
icy and receiver that can decrypt, so it is considered useful for more complex access control. The CP-FE scheme is defined as follows. Setup(1 λ , n := (d; n 1 , ..., n d )) -On input 1 λ (λ :security parameter), the max number of categories for attributes d, format n := (d; n 1 , ..., n d ) of attributes (n i :dimension of vector of value x i . For all i, n i = 2 in the case of our library.), output public parameter pk and master secret key sk.
On input pk, sk and a set of attributes Ψ := {(t,
On input pk, an access structure Υ which is used for decryption step, and plaintext m, output a ciphertext ct Υ . The formal definition about an access structure is given in Appendix A.2, and how to convert an access policy (which is given as a logical formula by the user of our FE library) to an access structure is given in Appendix A.2.1. Dec(pk, sk Ψ , ct Υ ) -On input pk, sk Ψ and ct Υ , output m if relation R(Ψ, Υ) = T rue holds.
Key-Policy Functional Encryption (KP-FE)
In KP-FE scheme, on the other hand, the parameter Υ expresses a set of attributes, and the parameter Ψ expresses an access structure for a secret key holder. Namely, Υ used in KP-FE scheme is equal to Ψ used in CP-FE scheme, and Ψ used in KP-FE scheme also is equal to Υ used in CP-FE scheme. For example, Υ is a set like ("Gender = male", "Position = manager"), and Ψ is a predicate like ("Gender = male" AND "Position = manager").
In the scheme, the encrypted data can be decrypted if and only if the set of attributes Υ satisfies the access structure Ψ.
The situation in which the KP-FE scheme is used is different from that of the CP-FE scheme. For example, KP-FE scheme is supposed to be used for a management of streaming service (Fig. 2) .
The KP-FE scheme is defined as follows. Setup(1 λ , n := (d; n 1 , ..., n d )) -On input 1 λ (λ :security parameter), the max number of categories for attributes d, format n := (d; n 1 , ..., n d ) of attributes (n i :dimension of vector of value x i . For all i, n i = 2 in the case of our library.), output public parameter pk and master secret key sk. KeyGen(pk, sk, Ψ := (M, ρ)) -On input pk, sk and an access structure Ψ := (M, ρ), output decryption key sk Ψ , which corresponds to Ψ. Enc(pk, Υ := {(t,
On input pk, a set of attribute Υ which is used for decryption step, and plaintext m, output a ciphertext ct Υ . Dec(pk, sk Ψ , ct Υ ) -On input pk, sk Ψ and ct Υ , output m if relation R(Ψ, Υ) = T rue holds.
Implementation

Application
In this section, we explain how to use our library. Our implementation uses the TEPLA library [20] for pairing operations, and is an asymmetric version of dual pairing vector spaces constructed using asymmetric bilinear pairing groups. We consider the application like the example below.
Preparation (Setup)
This library needs to distribute an attribute list describing a set of attributes, public parameter (pk) used in Encryption step, and decryption key (sk Ψ ) in which information of attributes of a user Ψ is embedded. An administrator that manages access to files on the system executes Setup and then generates pk and sk. In Setup step, the administrator inputs the max number of categories for attributes d as argument (Fig. 3) . The administrator has only to execute Setup once, even when using both FE schemes. The generated pk and sk mainly include the information for encrypting a file and generating a decryption key respectively. The file containing pk currently needs to be placed in a directory where the operation Enc is executed, and the file including sk needs to be placed in a directory where the operation KeyGen is executed.
Before generating a decryption key (sk Ψ , which is used to decrypt an encrypted file), the administrator needs to create a file describing an attribute list corresponding to Ψ. The attributes in the list are defined as tuples of category and value. The current supported file format is csv. In the example below ( Fig. 4) , At-tributeList.csv defines three categories "Gender", "Department", and "Position". These categories have several values respectively. Once a list file is created, any category can be added later at any time unless the number of categories described in the list exceeds d. The value of a category can also be added to the list file later unless the number of values exceeds the limit determined by the public parameter. When the list file is updated, the administrator needs to re-distribute the file to users (but the administrator does not need to re-issue pk).
Key Generation
To generate sk Ψ , the administrator inputs pk, sk, attribute list, and the information of attributes of a user Ψ. In the CP-FE scheme the parameter Ψ is a set of attributes, and in the KP-FE scheme, the parameter Ψ is an access policy (Fig. 5) . The administrator executes KeyGen (Fig. 6) , and the generated sk Ψ is distributed to each user securely (Fig. 7) . These figures are for the case of CP-FE scheme.
Encryption
When a user encrypts a file, the user inputs pk, attribute list, and the information of attributes. In the CP-FE scheme, the in- formation of attributes for a ciphertext is an access policy. The access policy used in our library is a logical formula using categories and values described in the attribute list. In the access policy, we can use not only AND or OR gates but also t-out-ofn threshold gates and NOT gates to specify a more sophisticated and flexible access policy (Fig. 8) . In the access policy used in the KP-FE scheme (the parameter Ψ of decryption key sk Ψ ), we can also use these gates. The user executes Enc and generates a ciphertext file that has the access policy specified by the user.
In the KP-FE scheme, the information of attributes for a ciphertext is a set of attributes (equal to the parameter Υ of ciphertext ct Υ in CP-FE scheme).
The generated ciphertext file is divided into two parts. One is the encrypted data and the other is the data describing the access policy (CP-FE scheme) or the set of attributes (KP-FE scheme). For efficient encryption, the plaintext file is encrypted by AES * 4 , and the random temporary key of AES is encrypted by the CP-FE scheme or the KP-FE scheme. Only if the access policy for the ciphertext or decryption key is satisfied, the random temporary key of AES is obtained and the ciphertext can be decrypted.
Decryption
When a user decrypts an encrypted file, the user inputs pk and sk Ψ . In the CP-FE scheme, the user executes Dec and can decrypt the encrypted file only if sk Ψ including the user's set of attributes Ψ satisfies the access policy for the encrypted file ( Fig. 9) . In the KP-FE scheme, in a similar way, the user executes Dec and can decrypt the encrypted file only if the set of attributes Ψ for the file satisfies the access policy for the decryption key sk Ψ . Our library verifies whether the user can decrypt the encrypted file or not. If and only if Ψ satisfies Υ, the key of AES is obtained and the ciphertext file encrypted by AES can be decrypted. * 4 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [6] is a symmetric key encryption scheme adopted by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and is used widely as a standard symmetric key encryption scheme. 
Performance Measurements
We now provide the result on the performance of our library. The measurements were taken on the environment shown in Table 1. Our implementation uses OpenSSL for AES and a hash function (SHA-1 * 5 ), and the random number generation in our implementation uses the function of GMP (GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library) * 6 . TEPLA is used for pairing operations, and the calculation on pairing is using Optimal Ate Pairing over Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curves at the 128-bit security level [4] . Although the performance measurements were taken on the Mac OS environment, our library supports also Windows OS and Linux OS. The library still has room for improvement of algorithms, so the measurements here are only a rough estimate. Figures 10 and 11 display measurements of time for Enc and Dec regarding the file size respectively, and the access policy used in Enc consists of one attribute. The plaintext data used in this measurements is a text file, and the access policy consists of 1ANDgate. Figures 12 and 13 display measurements of time for Enc and Dec regarding the number of attributes of an access policy respectively, and the file size of plaintext is 10 MB. As expected, * 5 Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) is a hash function adopted by NIST. the time for Enc and Dec is linear in the number of attributes associated with the access policy. Furthermore, as the result on the performance (Fig. 13) shows, the time for Dec is actually linear in the minimum number of attributes that are required to satisfy the access policy. For example, in comparison between the runtimes for Dec of two access policies ("A" AND "B" AND "C") and ("A" OR "B" OR "C"), the former access policy needs more time compared with the latter access policy because the number of pairing operations needed for decryption with the former access policy is larger than that of the latter access policy. However, the file itself is encrypted by AES, so the time for Enc or Dec will be mainly affected by AES as the file size becomes large.
Future Work
There are some functions or another FE scheme that we are going to implement to make the library more convenient to use.
Numerical Attributes and its Expression
When a category has numerical values like age, an access policy including the category may need not only "=" or " " but also "<" or ">". Though using only "=" or " " can also express "<" or ">", it can be inconvenient. For example, when a category "A" has "1" to "30" as numerical values, access policy ("A ≤ 15") needs to be expressed as ("A = 1" or "A = 2" or ... or "A = 15"), and as the range for the values becomes larger, it is more awkward to express the access policy only by using equality (without inequality).
To avoid this inconvenience, we allow users to use inequali- * 7 The administrator can choose one of these two according to application scenarios. ties "<" and ">" in the descriptions of access policies as syntactic sugar. Here we assume that the numerical attributes are represented in one of two representations, i.e., non-binary representation (the aforementioned example) or binary representation ( Fig. 14) * 7 . As the aforementioned example, the former representation is sometimes inconvenient when the size of description of access policy is large. The latter representation, on the other hand, can make the description of the access policy decrease to about the bit size of the value as mentioned in Ref. [3] . Therefore, to improve the usability, we are going to implement this functionality (syntactic sugar) such that our library converts the inequalities "<" and ">" in the description of an access policy into the appropriate description automatically (Fig. 14) .
Inner-Product Encryption
The ABE schemes like CP-FE and KP-FE possess the security property called payload hiding, which guarantees that a ciphertext associated with attribute I hides all information about the underlying message unless one holds a secret key giving the explicit ability to decrypt. However, these schemes may not be able to guarantee that a ciphertext hides all information about the associated attribute I. The inner-product encryption (IPE) scheme, on the other hand, guarantees that property, which is called attribute hiding. Attribute hiding security is the stronger notion of security than that of payload hiding security [11] . Therefore, by using the IPE scheme, a user can encrypt a data with all information about the associated attribute of the ciphertext secret.
The IPE scheme takes as an input Ψ := v ∈ F n q and Υ := x ∈ F n q , and, the encrypted data can be decrypted if and only if the inner product x · v = 0. We are going to add the IPE functionality based on our implementation of CP/KE-FE.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the implementation of the library of ciphertext-policy functional encryption and key-policy functional encryption based on the scheme of Refs. [15] , [16] . As a future work, we will release the library as open source software for building security systems. Furthermore, we are planning to implement the additional functionality and the IPE scheme which are mentioned in Section 4.
